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Why New Ventures
Grant Employee-Stock-Options

Elli Kraizberg++
Bar Ilan University
and
Vassilios N. Gargalas+++
Western Connecticut State University

As of 1998, nine percent of the shares of all firms in the US, primarily young and
small ones, have been owned, essentially by about 17 million employees. The recent
trend of new ventures to grant company-wide stock options plans is an alignment of
the interests of management, shareholders, and non-managerial employees. This
paper empirically explores the hypothesis that company-wide stock options plans
primarily serve the interests of the firm‟s management. This is true, whether or not,
management owns a stake in the firm‟s equity, though the degree of his or her
motivation varies depending on the size of his/her stake in the firm‟s equity. The
paper unambiguously disproves the view that grants of employee stock options are
meant to ease cash flow strains for small young firms.
I.

Introduction
A recent trend among small new firms is to grant company wide stock options.
In some industries, e.g., in the technology sector, at the time that the firm is
established and well before it goes public owned, already exists an employment
contract with a provision about the grant of stock options that may be exercised up
until and on the day the firm would go public. Newly established firms find that to
compete for skilled labor, they need to offer options to all employees from the very
start of the firm‟s operations.
Increasingly, new small size firms grant company wide stock options as an
incentive plan. A study by National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO)11
demonstrates that as of 1999, nine percent of the shares of all firms in the US,
primarily new small firms, were owned by 17 million employees. It estimates that in
++
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84
the US, as of 1999, there were 16,100 such plans in effect, 3,000 of which were
company-wide or “broad”2. By 1998, the number of such plans had undergone an
almost tenfold increase from its level in 1975. Actually, only 15% of these firms were
public, the rest were closely held and therefore small. Interestingly, most public firms
allow employees a stake of less than 10% of the firm‟s equity, while closely held
firms allow up to 30%.
Boards of directors tend to think that “broad” plans are in shareholders‟ best
interest. Recently, these boards have also been cited as favoring the grant of ESOs as
a mechanism to attract skilled labor. Proponents of the opposite view argue that
managers act in their own best interest, which runs against the idea that alignment of
managers and shareholders interests should be observed.
Several hypotheses, attempting to explain ESO plans, have been proposed in
the literature (see Section 1.1). First is the „incentive‟ argument, which says that ESO
plans induce real gains, manifested by higher employee productivity or reduction of
agency costs. The above is induced, either as a reaction to an existing plan, or, in
anticipation to the adoption of such a plan, as a reward for superior current
performance. The second hypothesis states that the adoption of an ESO plan conveys
some credible information, not already reflected in stock prices.
The hypotheses so far pertain to the change in the firm's overall value, while
the remaining ones refer to the conflict among the firm's various claimholders.
Accordingly, the third hypothesis raises the possibility that an incentive plan may
trigger tax benefits3, either to the shareholders or to the employees.
The fourth hypothesis says newly established growth firms, which may not be
in a position to meet their immediate cash flow obligations, could ease their strain by
substituting deferred equity for cash wages.
The final hypothesis says that an ESO plan may serve the interests and goals
of the firm's top management. In this event, ESO plans are granted by managers who
wish to maximize the value of their own claim. One implication of that is the “overretention” of funds, which arises when managers retain funds in the firm, for instance,
by substituting some equity for cash wages, in order to increase the coverage of their
own claim. Additionally, and this is the focus of this paper, managers may enhance
their own interests, by making riskier or less risky investments subsequent or prior to
an ESO plan, which may affect the value of the options held by the firm‟s employees.
The natural question to the above is whether managers increase the firm's
exposure to risk after granting an ESO plan, or, managers of riskier firms tend to grant
ESO plans more often than managers of less risky firms do? The answer is not trivial
and is somewhat different than the case in which options are granted solely to the
firm‟s top management. In the latter case, managers have an incentive to undertake
riskier investments in order to increase the value of their already owned, options,
which, at the same time, may have a negative long-term effect on their equityholdings or reputation. With “broad” ESO plans, increasing the firm's risk may
increase the value of the employees‟ options as well, therefore managers may have to
share the benefits.
2

The NCEO study deals with actual share ownership, that is, plans that have granted shares
(Employee Stock Ownership Plan – ESOP), or options that have been exercised (under Employee
Stock Options plans – ESO). Theoretically, however, stocks can be viewed as zero-exercise-price
options, or options with a very low exercised priced can be viewed as leveraged shares. Thus, for the
purpose of this paper, no distinction is made whether the plan is ESOP or ESO.
3
Employee stock ownership plans are governed by sections 401(A) and 4975(E) (7) of the Internal
Revenue Code and in section 407(D) (6) of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (FRI
SA). See also FASB exposure draft leading to SFAS 123 (Swieringa, 1987).
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The increasing the risk in order to increase the value of the already owned
options argument, can be erroneous. A positive relationship between risk and options
value is applicable to firm-external options for a given share price. ESOs are firminternal warrants, whose issuance may affect prices. Thus, it is possible that
increasing risk and granting ESOs will negatively affect warrants prices, if the share
price declines sufficiently, in reaction to the plan and to the higher level of risk.
Manager’s motivation in granting ESO plans
This study attempts model and test the manager‟s motivation in the decision to
grant an ESO plan (the fifth hypothesis above). It adds previously disregarded
variable, the manager‟s stake in the firm‟s equity. The interaction between this and
other variables already analyzed, points to a set of interpretations variable than the
conventional ones. The decision to grant an ESO plan and the extent of a manager‟s
control, or alternatively, the threat of being diluted, are related to variables such as,
the firm‟s risk, or, the manager‟s choice of the firm‟s level of risk, and the extent to
which debt is used.
Here the term manager-owner will refer to a manager who is supported or
nominated by a major shareholder as opposed to a professional manager, most likely,
of a diffused-ownership firm, whose interests are not aligned with those of a specific
shareholder. The two managers have different motivation in their decision making.
This observation may lead to a non-linear type of hypothesis, i.e., the decision to grant
an ESO plan may not demonstrate a monotonic relation with the above variables. This
means that an ESO plan is more or less likely only when the extreme levels of some
of these variables occur.
The position adopted here is that ESO plans serve the interests of the managerowner, without any consideration given to the interests of other claimholders. The
first hypothesis is that managers will increase the firm‟s risk when they grant an ESO
plan, or alternatively, managers of risky firms will tend to grant ESO plans, if they
have a controlling interest in the firm‟s equity. This paper will show that under a
certain condition, the higher the firm‟s level of risk, the smaller the number of options
the firm needs to grant. Hence, managers, concerned with the risk of dilution of their
controlling stake4, will focus on the number of options granted to the employees,
given the optimal overall value of the options package. This ensures that higher risk is
associated with fewer options, and is not trivial, as demonstrated in Proposition 1.
Actually, the value of the options increases with risk only when the firm's overall
expenses-per-share exceed the difference between the firm's cash-inflow-per-share
and the exercise price of the option. The paper demonstrates that the strategy of highrisk ESO plans clearly dominates other strategies in conjunction with the following
parameters: the number of options granted, the level of the managers‟ equity holdings,
and the use of ESO plans as a mechanism to finance future wages, if the employees
exercise their options and pay the exercise price.
When it comes to claims on the firm‟s cash flows, the firm faces legal, stated
by contracts, and practical priorities, dictated by business practices. The firm has to
disburse funds to various claimholders in a manner that will best ensure its ability to
continue to operate. Thus, the professional manager competes against other cash flow
claimholders such as employees and debt holders. This paper hypothesizes the
following:
I.A

4

Alternatively, the firm could have issued ESOs that may be exercised to non-voting shares. These
ESOs, however, are less valuable and thus will require issuing of more ESOs, and more importantly, a
grant of ESOs of non-voting shares would lack the incentive argument underlying such grants.
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(i)

(ii)

(iii)

The higher the firm‟s debt ratio, the more a professional manager
will seek action to reduce “competition” on the part of other
claimholders, such as the employees, who have claims on the
firm‟s cash flows. Thus, granting an ESO plan that partially
substitutes equity for cash wages, or, a potential increase in cash
wages, serves this purpose.
Even though the value of the claims held by the firm‟s employees,
managers, and debt holders may not change, the grant of an ESO
plan that substitutes equity for a cash-wage claim, increases the
priority of the claim held by the professional manager.
Grant of an ESO plan may substitute equity for cash-wages as a
source of financing. Thus, as the firm‟s debt ratio increases, the
more likely the firm is to seek this alternative form of financing.

With the above in mind, consider two firms of equal equity size and equal
equity risk. If one of the firms has a higher debt ratio, ceteris paribus, the overall
firm‟s level of risk must be lower. Thus, the higher the level of debt and the lower the
level of the firm‟s overall risk the more likely a professional manager will be to grant
an ESO plan. The relationship, however, between risk and the decision by a
manager-owner to grant an ESO plan, isolating for the firm‟s debt ratio, is
ambiguous, since there is conflict between this manager‟s goal to protect his/her cash
flow claim (i.e., higher debt and low risk are more likely to trigger the grant of an
ESO plan), and his/her wish to protect his/her equity claims. That is, low risk is less
likely to trigger the grant of an ESO plan.
This paper will initially test the conventional hypotheses and proceed from
there. If, for example, empirical evidence rejects the fourth hypothesis, and concludes
that ESOs are not granted by firms because they are under a cash flow strain, the
paper will then proceed to isolate the relevant parameters which are related to the fifth
hypothesis. These parameters are: grant of an ESO plan, firm‟s level of risk, and
managerial stake in the firm‟s equity and the risk of management‟s dilution of its
controlling position.
It is doubtful that any of these parameters alone can explain the motivation
underlying the granting of ESO plans. This paper will first examine the relationship
between the decision to grant an ESO plan, risk and level of control. Interestingly,
while it is widely accepted that higher risk industries tend to grant ESO plans, the
hypothesis regarding the risk level of individual firms may be rejected. If the sector‟s
risk level can explain an ESO plans while individual firms‟ risk can not, then the
measure of risk should be defined in relative terms, i.e., individual firm‟s risk relative
to the firm‟s industry risk.
Failure of the tests that consider the joint impact of all the independent
variables to explain the decision to grant an ESO, will be interpreted as support for a
non-linear relationship: at the extreme values of the variables - “high risk - high level
of control” and “low risk low level of control” - the grant of ESO plans is more likely
than otherwise. Thus, this paper will proceed in testing the cross-variables hypotheses,
that is, testing, e.g., the relationship between risk and grant of an ESO plan, for a subsample of firms with high level of control as opposed to a sub sample of firms with
low level of control.
In the event of confirmation of the non-linear relationship, we will interpret
the result as support for this paper‟s hypothesis, which is divided into two parts:
First, manager-owners will be inclined to increase the firm‟s level of risk upon
the grant of an ESO plan, or alternatively, managers of firms with a high level of risk
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will tend to grant ESO plans, if they have a controlling interest in the firm‟s equity.
Second, firms with managers who do not own a stake of the firm‟s equity, will tend to
grant an ESO plan the higher the firm‟s debt ratio and the lower the over-all risk level
of the firm.
I.B

Review
A large body of literature examines the motivation underlying granting of ESO
plans. The Economics literature, for example, focuses on the “incentive argument”;
namely, whether granting of an ESO plan enhances the firm‟s performance, or,
reduces agency costs. As Conte and Svejnar (1990), point out, the results are
inconclusive5.
The accounting and finance literature explores the tax benefit hypothesis and the
information effect. Hite and Long (1982), and Miller and Scholes (1982) discuss the
tax hypothesis, whether the plan affects corporate tax, or the recipients of the benefits
of the plan. Executive options and alignment of managers and shareholders interests
are discussed in Noreen(1976), Larcker (1983), Brickley, Bhagat and Lease (1985),
Tehranian and Waegelein (1985), Warner (1985), Healy (1985), Agrawal and
Mandelker (1987), Lambert et al. (1991), and Hemmer (1993). The results
demonstrate significant positive stock price reactions to these plans, which makes it
difficult to argue that these plans are merely “excessive perks” whose adoption may
hurt shareholders.
This segment of the literature is also concerned with the proper valuation of
employee-stock-options, so that expenses reported by firms that grant these options
will not be misstated. Additionally, it was argued that the adoption of plans reveals
positive insider information that can serve as a credible signal. Specifically, a plan
that involves a bigger equity stake for the senior management may be viewed as a
disclosure of a credible signal (Brickley et al. (1985)).
Managerial literature focuses on how employee motivation and performance are
affected by incentive plans and disregards, however, the firm‟s point of view.
Kraizberg et al. (2000) demonstrates that even when considering the employees‟ point
of view, ESO plans are not necessarily superior to other incentive schemes.
The key issue is whether the grant of an ESO plan triggers a redistribution of the
firm's cash flows, or whether the real gains, induced by the plan, are allocated among
the firm's claimholders. When a firm‟s claimholder, such as the manager, may take
action that may increase the value of his own claim at the expense of other
claimholders, one may wonder what stops him/her from emptying all other claims.
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), Harris and Raviv (1979), Fama (1980),
Jensen and Ruback (1983), it is clear that there are mechanisms that protect the value
of the non-active claimholders. These are either external market mechanisms, such as
the threat of take-overs, share prices reflecting that the firm‟s management has acted
prudently or imprudently, or internal corporate mechanisms, such as the replacement
of top management (Coughaln and Schmidt (1985). These mechanisms, however, are
not practical when the top management owns the majority of the firms‟ shares. In this
case, the managers‟ actions may not coincide with other claimholders‟ interests, since
the managers are able to conceal their motivation, irrespective of whether or not they
are internally monitored.

5

Interestingly, similar literature, dealing with executive compensation and relative performance
evaluation mode, is also inconclusive (see Jensen and Murphy (1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1990),
Barro and Barro(1990), Janakiraman, Lambert and Larcker(1992), Aggarwal and Samwick(1998,
1999).)
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Jensen and Zimmerman (1985) and Warner (1985)6 concluded that exists both
direct and indirect evidence suggesting alignment of mangers' and shareholders'
interests when management grants itself stock options. Therefore, there is a positive
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance or stock price
reaction.
Self-serving motivation has been discussed in the literature, with several
implications. First, the self-serving view is reinforced when the managers‟ horizon is
shorter than the corporation's infinite life (Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Tehranian
and Waegelein (1985)). Managers may tend to take riskier investments when their
salaries are linked to the firm‟s performance, as, for instance, when they grant
themselves stock options7. This conclusion agrees with option theory, since a higher
risk will tend to increase the value of those options (Agrawal and Mendelker (1987)
Lewellen, Lorderer and Martin (1987), Lambert, Larcker and Verrechia(1991).
Finally, the over-retention problem arises because managers have incentives to retain
funds to increase the coverage of their fixed salary claims (Tehranian and Waegelein
(1985), Lambert (1989)).
Brickley et al. (1985) demonstrate that while introduction of long-term
compensation plans increases shareholder wealth, when the latter is measured by
abnormal returns of common shares, but yet, plans with option components show
lower returns, though these results are not statistically significant.
II.

The model
The number of ESOs granted is a crucial variable for a manager who owns a
major stake in the firm‟s equity, and may therefore have to face dilution of his
control. The model that follows does not go counter to the conventional view that an
ESO plan will induce positive real effects, in addition, the model allows for the
possibility that the grant of an ESO plan may substitute cash wages or cash wage
increases.
The model is a single period model, in which all cash flows are realized at the end
of the period. However, decisions such as granting an incentive plan and reactions of
employees and managers to the plan, occur at the beginning of the period. The labor
market is competitive, the capital markets are efficient, and firm‟s securities are
traded continuously. Transaction costs are disregarded and there is no asymmetry of
information.
Some important ESO aspects that are very unlikely to alter the paper‟s
conclusions, are ignored. For example, it is implicitly assumed that whether or not
there is a positive relationship between the grant of ESOs and increased employees‟
effort, the managers‟ motivation to grant ESOs, as described here, is not affected.
The model considers a firm whose uncertain net cash flows are allocated among
four claimholders: tax collectors, wage recipients, managers, who may or may not
own equity, and non-managerial shareholders. Wages are initially assumed to be
riskless8; that is, in any state of the world, the firm's inflows exceed wage claims.
Managers may own a share of the firm's equity, while their compensation package is
6

Cf. their review of a series of papers by Murphy (1985), Benston (1985), Healy (1985), Brickley,
Bhagat and Lease (1985), Coughaln and Schmidt (1985), Tehranian and Waegelein (1985), Johnson,
Magee, Nagarajan and Newman (1985), Lambert and Larcker (1985), and Lewellen, Lorderer and
Rosenfeld (1985).
7 7
In principle, an ESO plan must be approved by the board of directors. It is easier for the managers
to ask for board approval when it comes to a company-wide plan, rather than a limited Executive
Compensation plan. See Smith and Watts (1984), Coughlan and Scmidt , and Brickley et al (1985).
8
This assumption is not crucial since the conclusions of this model are reinforced if wages are
assumed to be risky.
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linked to the firm's total inflows and is subject to risk because their claim has a lower
priority than that of wage recipients. Finally, the payoff of any security can be
spanned by substituted securities. Specifically, there is a set of uniquely priced state
contingent claims. To make the presentation simpler, without loss of generality, a
simple discrete model is developed. There is a set of state contingent claims, which
promise one dollar, if state i (i  H ) occurs. Each claim‟s current value is qi , thus, the
risk-free rate of interest, r f 9 equals
H

1 /  qi  1 , i  H .

(1)

i

Initially, the firm pays fixed wages in the amount of W , where the firm‟s cash
flows are Fi , i  H . W  Fi , i .
Senior management‟s claim is Mi . Thus, the net earnings at the end of the
period, or shareholders‟ claim in state i, given the tax rate of  , is:
E i  ( Fi  W  M i )(1   ) .

(2)

The current value of equity is therefore:
H

H

i

i

E0   qi Ei   qi ( Fi  W  M i )(1   ) .

(3)

The current share price is So  Eo / No , where N 0 is the initial number of
shares.
The firm considers granting an ESO plan to all employees at the beginning of
the period; the total number of options granted is Nc, whose value is C each, given
that the exercise price is X. The ESOs expire at the end of the period after earnings are
reported. The firm decides to grant an ESO plan, among other things, expecting to
induce positive real effects, such as increased sales, increased productivity, etc. Let
Bi be the net expected gains for state i. It is assumed that there is a well-defined
relationship between gains and the overall value of the ESOs. That is, the overall
value of the ESO package and the level of the desired gains are exogenously
determined (see Conte and Savenjar(1990). Thus, if there exists a unique optimal
plan10, the firm needs to issue a package of options with value equal to (NcC ) * , so
that the package may induce the desired goal (such as real gains, lower agency costs
etc.). Thus,

NcC  (NcC ) * .

(4)

It is assumed, initially, that the labor market and the market for managers are
competitive; that is, managers and employees are substitutable, and competitive labor
9

This assumption by no means implies that the model assumes risk-neutrality. Rather, risk-aversion is
imbedded in the value of the contingent claims, q.
10
As it is mentioned earlier, whether or not, there is a positive relationship between granting ESOs and
B is an important issue, but hardly relevant to the issue raised in this paper, therefore, we might as well
assume that B, if positive, is given exogenously. Similarly, the issue whether there exists an optimal
contract does not alter the conclusion of this model.
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markets dictate an implicit employment contract, according to which  , 0    1 , of
the value of the real gains, Bi , are allocated, ex-post, to the employees 11.
is a
market not a policy variable and need not be linear in Bi . Hence, if the labor market is
competitive, the cash wages at the beginning-of-the-period, W0 , are:


W0  W / (1  r f )   Nc. C    qi Bi  ,



(5)

This equation implies that the actual wages employees receive at the
beginning of the period equal W /(1  r f ) , set exogenously, and   qi Bi are the net
expected gains. These amounts are either paid in cash, W0 , or in options whose value
equals NcC.
While the value of a single share before the issuance is S 0B , its value
afterwards is:
H

S0A  ( E 0  NcC) / N 0   qi Si ,

(6)

i

where S i is the value of a share, if state i is realized. This is true, since at the end of
the period, if all ESO holders are rational, the price of a single share is:


Si  


( Ei  NcX ) /( N 0 Nc)

if

( Ei / N 0

if

X
X

(7)

and,
H

C   qi MAX {( Si  X ),0} =
i

 Ei  N 0 X 
,0
 0  Nc 

 q .MAX  N
i

i

(8)

Equation (8) implies that the firm needs to choose the number of options,
which in its turn affects the value of the options, so that the value of the package is
(NcC ) * .
In lieu of one of this paper‟s hypotheses, that the number of options granted is
a crucial control variable for a manager who owns a stake in the firm‟s equity,
Proposition 1 will derive the relationship between risk and number of options needed,
given (NcC)*.

11

The definition of a competitive labor market must be on an ex-post basis. If it were an ex-ante
implicit contract, then employees would have the incentive to underperform in reaction to the plan. On
the other hand, an ex-post contract is less realistic, primarily due to wage rigidity. If we allow,
however, a multi-period scenario with memory, the ex-post contract is a reasonable assumption. This
assumption also allow a trade-off between wages and otther compensation such as ESOs, on basis
other than a dollar for dollar.
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Proposition 1
If the labor market is competitive and the capital market is efficient in the
sense that all securities are properly priced, then the following relationship is valid:
Given that an optimal ESO plan must have a value of (NcC)*, the higher the risk
level associated with management compensation, the lower the number of ESOs,
Nc, a firm needs to grant under an incentive plan, if there is a state of nature, j, in
which,
( F j  W j  M j )(1   )  N 0 X ,

(9)

where W j is wages in state j, N 0 the initial number of shares, and X the exercise price.
Alternatively, the lower the risk management compensation is subject to, the
more likely condition (9) is to be met, so that the negative relationship between risk
and the number of ESOs holds. Thus, the larger the amount of wages that are
substituted by the grant of an ESO plan, the less likely it is that condition (9) will be
met.
Proof
(Available from the authors upon request)
III.

Data
The sample consists of 119 firms that are traded primarily on the NASDAQ.
Data on firms that granted ESO plans were obtained from Proxy Statements
(DEF14A) submitted to the SEC. We have established three sets of sub-samples12:

In 1999-2000, 42 firms reported that they had granted an ESO plan,
and more than 20% of their shares are held by a group of three or less
investors, or a closely related group. Firms, are controlled by another
firm, are included in the sample only if the holding company is
controlled by an individual or a closely related group.

In 1999, 38 firms reported they had granted an ESO plan, and no single
shareholder held more than 10% of outstanding shares, and no group of
three or less investors holds more than 20% of the firm‟s outstanding
shares.

A randomly selected set of 29 firms which have never been engaged in
an ESO plan, 12 with a controlling group and 17 without a controlling
group.
The ESO plans have the following characteristics:
(i) Any single full-time wage recipient is entitled to participate in the ESO
plan.
(ii) All options granted under the ESO plan can be exercised to regular shares
with unrestricted voting rights.
(iii) All sample firms have gone public prior to 1999, and their ESO plans may
have started as early as 1994.
The first two sub-samples are mostly comprised of firms listed on the
NASDAQ with foreign shareholders13 owning some of them, and 33 of these are

12

The first two sub-sets are believed to be an exhaustive list for this period, while the 60 firms in the
third subset were selected based on the availability of data about holding patterns.
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“technology firms”. This may create a potential bias, since one may suspect that
“technology firms” are riskier, irrespective of this paper‟s hypothesis that managersowners, while granting ESO plans, tend to increase the firm‟s risk. Thus, in order to
control for a possible “industry effect” we define an industry-adjusted risk measure
(see section IV.2).
A portion of the firms have granted an ESO plan before or on the date of the
initial public offering14. Both because they were about to go public and that „going
public‟ is associated with the grant of an ESO plan, employees had expected the plan
well before it had actually been announced. In most firms, the initial employment
contract of most employees provided for a future ESO plan, contingent upon the firm
going public.
IV.

Methodology and the results
This paper hypothesizes that the decision to grant a company-wide ESO plan
and the change in the firm's level of risk as well as in the firm‟s level of debt are
linked to the issue of whether or not the firm‟s manager has a controlling stake in the
firm's equity. Specifically, if the manager has a controlling stake in the firm, he will
be inclined to increase the firm‟s level of risk, if an ESO plan is granted, or
alternatively, the management of high-risk firms will tend to grant an ESO plan.
On the other hand, firms whose management does not hold a controlling
interest in the firm‟s equity, will tend to do the opposite, that is, an ESO plan is more
likely as the firm‟s debt ratio increases and the over-all level of risk of the firm is
lower.
We begin by testing the hypothesis that states that the grant of an ESO plan is
meant to induce real gains, which is not in conflict with this paper‟s hypotheses.
IV.A ESO plan as a mechanism to induce employees’ performance
The conventional view is that granting ESO plans is meant to induce and enhance
employees‟ performance and therefore constitutes an alignment of shareholders‟,
management‟s, and employees‟ interests. Thus, if we confirm this conventional view and - this paper‟s hypothesis, we may conclude that granting an ESO plan is an
efficient tool that induces real net gains, while also serving the interests of the firm‟s
manager.
The relationship between employees‟ performance and granting an ESO plan
is tested through two variables: sales-per-employee in annual terms, and sales-peroverall-costs of employees, (including cash wages reported by the firm, but not the
value of the options granted through ESO plans). We also test directly the relationship
between shareholder claims, earnings, and the grant of ESO plans. The results are in
Table 1:
We cannot reject the hypothesis of a positive relationship between employees‟
performance and the granting of ESO plans. We cannot say, however, whether or not
firms with superior employee performance tend to grant ESOs as a reward, or whether
granting ESOs positively impacts employee performance. This question is probably
less significant in view of the fact that employees with superior performance
internalize the likelihood of a future reward in the form of an ESO or a bonus plan.

13

In some foreign markets, such as Israel and Sweden, most firms are controlled by shareholders who
have majority-interest in the firm‟s equity. This characteristic is widespread even though these firms
are traded in the US.
14
In some firms in the first two-samples employees have signed an employment contract whereby
upon going public they will be granted ESOs.
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IV.B ESO plan as a mechanism to ease cash flow strains
The key variables are the firm‟s level of risk and level of shareholders‟
holdings and the grant of ESO plans. Risk, however, can be alternatively linked to a
different scenario. That is, one may hypothesize that growth firms, which are riskier
by nature, are likely to have cash flow strains, and thus, ESO plans which can
partially substitute cash wage obligations, may serve as a mechanism to ease these
cash flow strains.
The validity of this alternative hypothesis may be tested, either through the
indirect relationship between risk and grant of ESO plans, or by analyzing the direct
relationship between granting ESO plans and variables that are correlated with cash
flow strains. If risk, by itself, is the explanatory variable, then we must observe a
monotonic relationship between risk and granting ESO plans (see IV.3 below). Below
we will present the direct test of the cash-flow-strains hypothesis. One may expect
that firms under cash flow strains are more likely to grant ESO plans.
We tested the event of granting ESO plans against three variables that are
highly correlated with cash flow strains. The first two, Earnings per Share
(EARNING) and Dividend Yield (DIV.YIELD) are both negatively correlated with
cash flow strains. The third variable is Dividend Payout ratio (DIV.PAYOUT).
We also believe that debt burden can be positively related to cash flow strains,
that is, firms with higher debt-to-equity ratio (DEBT.EQ) will tend to grant ESO plans
in order to ease some of the debt service burden. This variable, however, is tricky; in
fact a positive relationship between debt-to-equity and granting of ESO plans may
support the conventional hypothesis IV.2, that is; that firms under heavy burden of
debt tend to ease cash flow strains by granting of ESO plans, but it can equally well
support this paper‟s hypothesis in IV.4. But if the cash flow strains hypothesis, tested
on other variables (EARNING, DIV.YIELD) is rejected, we may conclude that a
positive relationship between debt-to-equity ratio and grant of ESO plan supports this
paper‟s hypothesis. The results are given in Table II.
The significant positive relationship between grant of ESO plans and earningsper-share, dividend-payout ratio, and dividend yield tend to support the rejection of
the hypothesis that the major motivation for granting ESO plans is the need to ease
cash flow strains, since the results indicate that firms with fewer cash flow strains
tend to grant more ESO Plans than firms which do face cash flow strains.
On the other hand, the significant positive relationship between granting of
ESO plans and debt-to-equity ratio could indicate that firms with a heavy debt burden
may tend to ease this burden by granting ESO plans, and thereby reduce cash wages
obligations. We suspect, that this relationship stems from another motivation,
hypothesized here (see IV.4). We believe the results in IV.4 will support this
assertion.
IV.C Over all logistic multiple regression
Logistic regression estimates the probability of occurrence of binary event,
given continuous values of the explanatory variables.
Let the grant of an ESO plan be a binary variable with value „0‟ if ESO plan
has not been granted, and „1‟ if it has been granted. We wish to estimate the
probability Pr
Pr(ESO  1, / X 1  x1 ,... X i  xi ,..., X n  x n) ,

where X is the vector of the explanatory variables.

i  1, n

(10)
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Pr(.)
is the odds ratio, while 0<Pr(.)<1 , the odds ratio is an unrestricted positive
1  Pr(.)
Pr(.)
number, and Ln
is a well defined number. Thus we may make the assumption
1  Pr(.)
that
Ln

m
Pr(.)
=   j X ij   i , i =1,n
1  Pr(.) j 1

(11)

and the estimator for Pr(.) is therefore:

 b j X ij
P̂r(.) 

e
b X
1  e  j il

and ,

0  P̂r(.)  1 .

(12)

The first step is a simple multiple variable logistic regression where the model is:

ESO     1 DIV .PAYOUT   2 DIV .YIELD   3 CONTROL   4 BETA   5 BETA.IND 

 6 BETA.DIF   7 EARNING   8 EMPLOY   9 DEBT .EQ  
(13)
where
DIV.PAYOUT - Ratio of dividends payout to earnings
DIV.YIELD - Dividend yield
CONTROL - Fraction of shares owned by the controlling shareholders
BETA - Level of the firm‟s risk measured by its beta.
BETA.IND - Level of risk of the firm‟s industry measured by industry beta
EARNING - Firm‟s earnings per share
EMPLOY - Firm‟s number of employees
DEBT.EQ - Debt-to-equity ratio
BETA.DIF - We may need to reconsider the issue of measuring the firm‟s level of
risk, since one may argue that the sample includes firms that belong to riskier
industries. Interestingly, while it is common to think of higher risk industries such as
the technology sector as tending to grant ESO plans, the hypothesis regarding the
level of risk of individual firm may be rejected. This will be the case if this paper
finds that sector‟s risk level does explain the grant of ESO plans while the risk level
of individual firm, measured by BETA, does not. Thus, we believe that the measure of
risk should be defined in relative terms, i.e., individual firm‟s risk relative to the risk
of the firm‟s industry.15 Thus, we define the risk differential BETA.DIF, as:
{beta(i)/beta(I) – 1}, for firm i in industry I

(14)

The results are described in Table III. The first stage of the multiple variable
regression re-confirms the finding in IV.3, that is, the motivation underlying granting
15

S&P 500 for NYSE listed securities, and the NASDAQ index for the remaining ones.
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ESO plans may not be the firm‟s cash flow strains. Interestingly, using the stepwise
regression procedure, the results indicate that the most significant explanatory
variables for the grant of ESO plans are the dividend payout ratio, the debt-equity
ratio and the industry‟s beta. This may lead to the conclusion that (i) prospering firms
tend to grant ESO plans, perhaps, substituting conventional bonus plans to employees,
and, (ii) firms in riskier industries tend to grant ESO plans.
The lack of confirmation, so far, for this paper‟s main hypothesis is expected
since the motivations that are believed to be the ground for the decision to grant ESO
plans are different than the conventional ones, and/or are in conflict with each other.
Thus, the decision to grant an ESO plan may be non-linear with respect to variables
such as the firm‟s risk and level of control, that is; “high risk - high level of control”
and “low risk – low level of control can both trigger an ESO plan. Verification of this
hypothesis requires a different type of analysis, pursued in the next section.
IV.D Risk, control and grant of ESO plans
This paper hypothesizes that the decision to grant an ESO plan, the firm‟s
level of risk (either over-all risk or equity risk), the firm‟s debt ratio, and managerial
stake in the firm‟s equity are non-linearly related.
A manager-owner would be reluctant to grant an ESO plan, if it threatens his
or her control of the firm by diluting his or her equity position. However, since, the
higher the firm‟s level of risk the lower the risk of dilution (see proposition 1), he or
she will be more inclined to approve the grant of an ESO plan. Alternatively,
management will tend to increase the firm‟s level of risk while granting an ESO plan.
On the other hand, diffused-ownership firms in which management does not hold any
interest in the firm‟s equity, will tend to do the opposite, that is, a decision to grant an
ESO plan is more likely as the firm‟s debt ratio increases and the over-all level of risk
of the firm decreases.
Thus, we test the relationship between granting ESO plans and risk, while
viewing „control‟ as an exogenous parameter, for each of the following sample sets:
 Firms which have or have not granted ESO plans, but have a group of
major shareholders who control the firm and appoint their management
team, and,
 Firms, which have or have not granted ESO plans, and no shareholder
effectively controls the firm.

Then we re-shuffle the data and sort it by level of differential risk (DIFF), i.e., the
relative level of firm‟s risk to that of its industry:


Firms which have or have not granted ESO plans, but DIFF is greater than
zero, i.e., riskier than their respective industry, and,
 Firms which have or have not granted ESO plans, but DIFF is smaller
than zero, i.e., less risky than their respective industry.
The results are shown in Table IV.
Unlike the previous results in section IV.3., where these variables were tested
simultaneously, the results here tend to support this paper‟s hypotheses:
(i)

Differential firm‟s risk level (DIFF) is negatively related to ESO
plans when there is no controlling shareholder, but positively when
there is a group of shareholders who effectively control the firm‟s
decisions.
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(ii)

(iii)

Level of control is negatively related to the grant of ESO plans
when the firm‟s equity is less risky than its industry, and positively
related when the firm‟s equity is riskier than their respective
industry
Though debt-equity ratio was a crucial variable in section IV.3, the
results here indicate that this ratio is significant only for diffusedownership firms in which no shareholder effectively controls the
firm. This finding supports our assertion that the relationship
between the debt ratio and the grant of an ESO plan does not stem
from the cash flow strains hypothesis.

The results clearly demonstrate that firms which have granted ESO plans, can
be dichotomized along the following two types of managerial objective functions:
(i) If the firm is substantially controlled by a shareholder, the riskier its equity the
more likely it is to grant an ESO plan. In this case, under this paper‟s hypothesis that
relies on Proposition 1, the objective of a manager-owner is to avoid dilution of his or
her controlling position by minimizing the number of options granted given a constant
optimal value of the overall option package.
(ii) Low-risk firms with diffused-ownership are more likely to grant ESO plans when
their debt ratio is high, since the firm‟s managers are concerned with securing their
cash flow claims. While this paper‟s hypothesis is related to the over all level of risk
of the firm, we could not verify that „low-risk-equity‟ and „low-over-all-risk‟ have the
same effect on the manager‟s decision.
V.

Conclusion
The trend of “broad” ESO plans is often cited as a mechanism of improving
employees‟ performance, or easing cash flow strains, or attracting highly skilled
labor. The above arguments suggest an alignment of interests of all the firm‟s
claimholders.
Irrespective of whether or not granting an ESO plan actually serves the
interests of the employees, the shareholders, and the firm‟s creditors, this paper
hypothesizes that granting ESO plans serves the goals of the firm‟s managers, which,
in turn, depend on the managers‟ motivations which stem from the specific type of
their firms.
This paper empirically supports that a manager-owner, motivated by the wish
to avoid dilution of his controlling position, is more likely to grant an ESO plan, the
riskier the firm‟s equity, while a manager of a diffused ownership firm, is more
likely to grant an ESO plan when the firm‟s debt ratio is high and the overall risk
level is low. The implication is clear. While the manager-owner‟s interests are in
conflict with those of the employees and of the non-control seeker shareholders, there
is an alignment of interest between those of the manager of a diffused-ownership firm
and the of employees, perhaps because the manager perceives the employees, who
have been granted ESOs, as potential supporters, in the event of an hostile take over.
To verify this interpretation, one could analyze two important parameters of
ESO plans: the exercise price of the options and the terms of payments for the
exercise price granted to the firm‟s employees. This paper showed that, given the
firm‟s level of risk, the lower the exercise price associated with these ESOs, the lower
the immediate dilution risk, although the manager-owner can not avoid dilution in the
future. This statement supports the observation that ESOs may be a mechanism of
financing future wages.

97
REFERENCES:
Aggarwal, R., and A.A. Samwick, “Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition,
and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence”, Journal of
Finance, December 1999.
Baro.J.R., and R.J. Barro, “Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bnak CEOs “, Journal
of Labor Economics, 1990, 8 pp 448-81.
Ben-Ner A., and B. Jun, “Employee Buyout in a Bargaining Game with Asymmetric
Information”, American Economic Review, 86, 1996, pp. 502-522
Bolster, P., and D. Chance, and D. Rich, “Executive Equity Swaps and Corporate
Insider Holdings”, Financial Management, 55, 1996, pp. 14-24.
Brickley, J.A., and S. Bhagat and R.C. Lease, " The Impact of Long-Range
Managerial Compensation Plans on Shareholder wealth", Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 1985, 7, pp. 115-129.
Conte, M.A., and J. Svejnar, “The Performance Effects of Employee Ownership
Plans”, in “Paying for Productivity” edited by A.S. Blinder, The Brooking
Institute, 1990, pp 143-172.
Cuny, J.C. and P. Jorion, “Valuing Executive Stock Options with Endogenous
Departure”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20, 1995, pp. 193-205.
Foster, T.W.III, and P.R. Koogler, and D. Vickrey, “Valuation of Executive Stock
Options and the FASB Proposal”, The Accounting Review 66, 1991, pp 595610.
Galai, D., “A Note on “Equilibrium Warrant Pricing Models and Accounting for
Executive Stock Options”, Journal of Accounting Research, 27, 1989, pp. 313315.
Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy, “ Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive
Officers” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 1990, 43, 30-s – 51-s.
Hemmer, T. “Riskfree Incentive Contracts: Elimination Agency Costs using option
based Compensation Schemes”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16,
1993, 85-89
Hite, G.L., and M.S. Long, "Taxes and Executive Stock Options", Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 1982, 4, 3-14.
Huddart, S., “Employee Stock Options”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18,
1994, pp. 207-231
Kraizberg E., A. Tziner, and J. Weisberg “Employee Stock Options: Are they Indeed
Superior to other Incentive Schemes?”, Journal of Business and Psychology,
Forthcoming 16(3), Spring 2002 pp383-390.
Lambert, R.A., and W.N. Lanen and D.F. Larcker, “Executive Stock Option Plans and
Corporate Dividend Policy”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
24, 1989, 24, pp. 409-425.
Lambert, R.A., and D.F. Larcker, “ An Analysis of the use of Accounting and Market
Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts,” Journal of
Accounting Research, 1987, pp. 85-125
Miller, M.H. and M.S. Scholes, "Executive Compensations; Taxes and Incentives",
1982, In Financial Economics: Essays in honor of Paul Cootner, Prentice Hall,
pp. 179-201.
Miller, M.H. and M.S. Scholes, "Executive Compensations; Taxes and Incentives",
1982, In Financial Economics: Essays in honor of Paul Cootner, Prentice Hall,
pp. 179-201.

98
Noreen, E., and M. Wolfson, “Equilibrium Warrant Pricing Models and Accounting
for Executive Stock Options, Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 1981, pp.
384-398.
Tehranian H. and J. Waegelein, “Market Reaction to Short Term Executive
Compensation Plan Adoption”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7,
1985.

99

Table I

High-risk firm
End-of-period
outcomes
Favorable
Unfavorable
state
state

Value of firm's assets
Management's
compensation
Share price
Number of options
granted
Exercise price of the
options
The value of a single
option
Value of options
package to employees,
substituting 117 of fix
wages

572
143
1.95

175
43.75
1.3125
520 16

Low-risk firm
postoffer
present
value

End-of-period
outcomes
Favorable
Unfavorable
state
state

postoffer
present
value

356
89

472
118

300
75

356
89

1.5

1.7318

1.5852
780

1.5

1.5

1.5

0.225

0.15

117

117

The number options that are granted under an ESO plan are given above for high and
low-risk firms. In both cases, the firm‟s value, price per share, management and
employees packages are assumed to remain unchanged as a result of the grant of the
ESOs. Yet, the risky firm needs to grant only 520 options as opposed to 780 options
of the low-risk firm. The numbers however were chosen so as to comply with
Proposition 1.

16

We solve three equations simultaneously (6),(7),(8) and the assumption that the overall value of the
ESOs granted is equal to the total pre-offer fix wages (4). For example, share price of the high risk
firm in the unfavorable state is (175-43.75+0)/100 and (572-143+520*1.5)/620 in the favorable one.
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TABLE II
This Table presents the results regarding the issue whether firms under cash flow strains tend to grant
ESO plans.
ESO plans and cash flow strains
Variables

Statistics

Dividend yield

(DIV.YIELD)

Dividend payout ratio

(DIV.PAYOUT)

Earning per share

(EARNING)

Debt - equity ratio

(DEBT.EQ)

Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD

1.21
1.72
17.78
24.62
1.10
1.65
1.70
8.47

%
%
%
%

Regressions Results
1

2

3

4

DIV.YIELD

=

0.031
(.1074)

+

1.478
(4.4369)

ESO
*

F
R
Adjusted R
Standard E
Reg SumSq
Reg MeanSq
Res SumSq
Res MeanSq
=
0.3332
(.0082)

: 19.68(0.00)
: 0.37812
: 0.13572
: 1.5801
: 49.151
: 49.151
:
294.6
:
2.496
+ 22.3177
(4.761)

ESO
*

F
R
Adjusted R
Standard E
Reg SumSq
Reg MeanSq
Res SumSq
Res MeanSq
=
0.3906
(1.324)

: 22.66(0.0)
: 0.4014
: 0.1540
: 22.235
: 11206
: 11206
: 58339
:
494.4
+ 0.8247
(2.428)

ESO
*

F
R
Adjusted R
Standard E
Reg SumSq
Reg MeanSq
Res SumSq
Res MeanSq
DEBT.EQ
=
0.2974
(1.320)
F
R
Adjusted R
Standard E
Reg SumSq
Reg MeanSq
Res SumSq
Res MeanSq
* Significant at 5% or less

: 5.89(.017)
: 0.2199
: 0.0401
: 1.5882
: 14.876
: 14.876
: 292.616
: 2.5222
+ 0.7837
(2.983)
: 8.90(.003)
: 0.2858
: 0.0725
: 1.1705
: 12.196
: 12.196
: 137.01
: 1.3701

DIV.PAYOUT

EARNING

ESO
*
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TABLE III
Multiple-variable Logistic Regression and Forward Stepwise (conditional).
Logistic Regression
1. Multiple variables
Classification Table
Observed
ESO P
ESO P

0
14
4

0
1

Constant is included

Predicted
1
19
42.42%
86
95.56%
overall 85.37%
Cut off value - .5

Variables in the equation


conatant

1.386

div.yield
div.payout
control
beta
beta.ind
beta.dif
earning
employ
debt.eq

S.E.
0.354
Score
3.983
4.587
0.870
0.757
0.191
0.501
3.433
2.214
4.221

Wald Significance
15.374
0.00
Significance
0.047
0.032
0.351
0.384
0.662
0.479
0.064
0.137
0.037

2. Forward Stepwise
Model Summary
step
1
2
3

-2 log cox &Snell Nagelkerke R
likelihood R square
Square
42.513
0.14
0.221
38.512
0.206 0.326
35.096
0.258 0.409
Variables in the equation

step
1
2

3

variables
constant
div.payout
constant
div.payout
debt.eq
constant
div.payout
debt.eq
beta.ind

0.457
0.035
1.085
0.058
1.941
4.259
0.125
2.140
3.944

SE
0.745
0.859

2.140

Wald significance
0.376
0.540
3.195
0.074
1.594
0.207
5.187
0.023
4.667
3.960
0.047
6.365
0.012
5.976
0.015
2.778
0.096
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TABLE IV
This Table presents the results regarding the relationship between the grant of ESO plans, risk
and debt ratio (debt.eq) for various levels of control, or the relationship between the grant of
ESO plans and control for various level of relative risk (diff).
Regressions
Results
1
diff
= 0.00443
+
-0.35017
(Low level of control, <15%) (.0399)
(-2.611)
F
: 6.82(.011)
R
: 0.3081628
Adjusted R
: 0.0810407
Standard E
: 0.5091329
2
diff
= -0.3231
+
0.32713
(High level of control,>15%) (-2.5571)
(2.3587)
F
: 5.56(.022)
R
: 0.3136234
Adjusted R
: 0.0806804
Standard E
: 0.3791017
3
beta
= 0.74143
+
-0.1723
(Low level of control, <15%) (6.6119)
(-1.2732)
F
: 1.62(.21)
R
: 0.1559835
Adjusted R
: 0.0093205
Standard E
: 0.5138635
4
beta
= 0.935
+
0.104091
(High level of control,>15%) (5.7296)
(0.5811)
F
: .337(.56)
R
: 0.0811149
Adjusted R
: 0.0065796
Standard E
: 0.4895569
5
beta.ind
= 0.66942
+
0.17448
(Low level of control, <15%) (6.6527)
(1.4367)
F
: 2.06(.15)
R
: 0.1754468
Adjusted R
: 0.0158705
Standard E
: 0.4611161
6
beta.ind
= 1.2666
+
-0.02075
(High level of control,>15%) (10.3410)
(-1.5435)
F
: 2.38(.12)
R
: 0.211258
Adjusted R
: 0.025897
Standard E
: 0.367466
7
debt.eq
= 0.29526
+ 0.8696
(Low level of control, <15%) (1.0584)
(2.5339)
F
: 6.42(.01)
R
: 0.3259892
Adjusted R
: 0.0897184
Standard E
: 1.2159267
8
debt.eq
= 0.3025
+
2.8869
(High level of control,>15%) (.0678)
(0.5896)
F
: 0.34(.55)
R
: 0.0875506
Adjusted R
: 0.0076651

ESO
*

ESO
*

ESO

ESO

ESO

ESO

ESO
*

ESO
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Regressions
Results
Standard E
control
= 33.4785
Low level of risk , diff<0 (7.2829)
F
R
Adjusted R
Standard E
10
control
= 5.3782
High level of risk, diff>0 (1.5243)
F
R
Adjusted R
Standard E
* Significant at 5% or less.
9

+

+

: 12.616449
-19.0615
(-3.616)
: 13.07(.00)
: 0.3991627
: 0.1471472
: 18.953375
14.6373
(3.5558)
: 12.64(.00)
: 0.4604301
: 0.1952299
: 12.721541

ESO
*

ESO
*

